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On Tax Increase Limitations:
Part II — Evasion and Transcendence
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
David Gamage Darien Shanske
In our previous column in this series we argued
that tax increase limitations (TILs) are analytically
incoherent. We further suggested that this incoher-
ence contributes to the observed ineffectiveness of
TIL regimes.1 In this, our second column, we analyze
the implications of the incoherent nature of TILs. In
particular, we argue that because of their incoherent
nature, TILs can be effectively evaded by a legisla-
tive majority wanting to do so.
There are several reasons why it is worth discuss-
ing strategies for circumventing TILs. First, and
perhaps most obviously, that TILs can be effectively
evaded illustrates our point in the prior column
about TILs being incoherent. Second, we believe
that these evasion strategies have in fact been used,
at least to some degree, and that reflecting on the
evasion strategies can thus help in understanding
the failure of TILs. Third, the evasion strategies
that we will discuss in this column may have posi-
tive normative features; by using the term ‘‘evasion’’
we do not mean to imply that there is necessarily
anything inappropriate about using these strate-
gies. Fourth, and finally, reflecting on the potential
for evading TILs is instructive for developing more
effective mechanisms for controlling the growth of
government — which we take to be the primary goal
of the advocates of TILs. Paradoxically, it turns out
that a promising strategy to evade TILs also poten-
tially functions as a mechanism for controlling the
size of government. Indeed, that strategy — the
increased use of benefit taxation combined with
refundable tax credits — could work still better were
it not for poorly designed TILs.
Two Strategies for Evasion
Without further ado, we will explore two related
strategies for circumventing TILs regimes: the ‘‘tax
expenditure’’ strategy and the ‘‘benefit charges with
refundable tax credits’’ strategy.
The Tax Expenditure Strategy
Suppose that the language of a given TIL provi-
sion was the following:
Any changes in state taxes enacted for the
purpose of increasing revenue collected pursu-
ant thereto whether by increased rates or
changes in methods of computation must be
imposed by an act passed by not less than
two-thirds of all members elected to each of the
houses of the Legislature.2
Note that what is essential to this provision is
that an overall change in state taxes does not
increase state revenue; this still leaves a lot of room
for maneuvering. Thus, instead of increasing taxes
in order to fund new spending, a majority party can
just pass a new tax credit to fund a desired program
while increasing other taxes or reducing other tax
expenditures. The overall tax package would be
revenue neutral in that it would not increase overall
taxes, but it would in effect accomplish the majority
1David Gamage and Darien Shanske, ‘‘On Tax Increase
Limitations: Part I — A Costly Incoherence,’’ State Tax Notes,
Dec. 19, 2011, p. 813, Doc 2011-25440, or 2011 STT 243-3. See
also, Michael Leachman, Nicholas Johnson, and Dylan
Grundman, ‘‘Six Reasons Why Supermajorities are a Bad
Idea,’’ State Tax Notes, Feb. 27, 2012, p. 703.
2This language is from Calif. Const. Art. 13A, section 3,
which was California’s TIL before the passage of Proposition
26 in November 2010. See also, e.g., Arizona Const. Art. 9,
section 2.
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party’s spending and taxing goals because the tax
expenditure would substitute for the increased
spending while the tax shift would shift tax liability
to where the majority wanted it to be.3
In theory, there are no limits to the types of
programs that could be funded in this manner.
Businesses and high-income individual taxpayers
could be given dollar-for-dollar tax credits against
their higher taxes in exchange for donating to state
spending programs (for example, universities or
healthcare programs), thus systematically exchang-
ing public funding for nominally private funding.
The more tax instruments a state has, the easier
that will be, but even a state without an income tax
can favor all manner of programs through sales tax
expenditures (while simultaneously raising the
sales tax on other goods or services).4
The tax expenditure strategy relies
on TILs not applying to
revenue-neutral packages that
reduce taxes on some taxpayers
(through tax expenditures) while
increasing taxes on others.
In short, the tax expenditure strategy relies on
TILs not applying to revenue-neutral packages that
reduce taxes on some taxpayers (through tax expendi-
tures) while increasing taxes on others. For most
existing state TILs, this strategy should suffice for
the majority party to evade TILs to the extent the
majority party so desires. But if the tax expenditure
strategy is unavailable, a majority party might still
use our second strategy — the benefit charges with
refundable tax credits strategy.
The Benefit Charges With Refundable Tax
Credits Strategy
The essence of this second strategy is to trans-
form the funding mechanism for government pro-
grams to benefit charges instead of general fund
expenditures. To defray the distributional impact of
these benefit charges, the state would then provide
refundable tax credits against the state income tax.
Those refundable credits should phase out with
income, so that low-income taxpayers could be com-
pletely reimbursed for benefit charges, whereas
higher-income taxpayers would be reimbursed only
partially.5 For example, consider tuition at public
colleges and universities. Even today, tuition at
those schools is a relative bargain compared with
many private colleges and yet recent dramatic in-
creases in tuition still undermine the public purpose
of state schools to provide affordable public higher
education. The solution to the riddle here could be to
allow tuition at public colleges and universities to
remain high — or even to become higher—— but to
then use tax credits to keep those schools affordable
for lower-income students. State higher education
credits could be administered, for example, through
the state income tax and could be modeled on federal
higher education tax credits. The credits could be
made refundable so that taxpayers without tax
liability would still be helped.
Individual taxpayers might still face liquidity
issues even with refundable credits because lower-
income taxpayers could have trouble paying benefit
charges, like tuition, upfront and then waiting for a
state income tax return. To address that problem,
the tax credits could be made advanceable. The
Affordable Care Act’s premium tax credits in new
IRC section 36B is an example of how tax credits can
be made advanceable. Under section 36B, state
Exchanges can make advance payments of the pre-
mium tax credits to pay for health insurance for
low-income taxpayers, with the taxpayers then rec-
onciling the advance payments with the amount of
the tax credits that they are allowed when they file
their tax returns.6 Similarly, for example, state
universities could receive advanceable state tax
credits to cover low-income taxpayers’ tuition.7
By using the benefit charges plus refundable tax
credits strategy, which we will henceforth call BCPP
(benefit charges plus progressivity), a majority party
can effectively evade TILs because funding can be
increased for state spending programs without actu-
ally needing to raise explicit taxes or spending. The
limit on this strategy is the preexisting state income
3For some examples, see Gamage and Shanske, supra note
1, at 814-815.
4And enacting that strategy through business tax ex-
penditures would be even easier.
5For more on this approach, see generally Darien Shanske,
‘‘Going Forward by Going Backward to Benefit Taxes,’’ Cali-
fornia Journal of Politics and Policy, vol. 3, issue 2, art. 14,
available at http://www.bepress.com/cjpp/vol3/iss2/14.
6For further discussion of how this works, see, e.g., Ed-
ward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘The Health-Related Tax Provisions of
PPACA and HCERA: Contingent, Complex, Incremental and
Lacking Cost Controls,’’ Cardozo Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 301 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1633556 (summarizing the many tax provisions of
the Affordable Care Act).
7There are trade-offs involved in making tax credits ad-
vanceable. Doing so requires a reconciliation process, wherein
taxpayers whose income ends up being higher than predicted
might be required to pay back excess advanceable credits
received, which could create complicated enforcement issues.
We cannot fully analyze those trade-offs here. Instead, we
merely mean to point out the possibility of making credits
advanceable in order to deal with liquidity issues.
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tax (or other preexisting state taxes).8 Refundable
tax credits can be used to completely alleviate the
expense of benefit charges for low-income taxpayers,
but positive tax liabilities cannot be assessed on
high-income taxpayers in excess of their preexisting
tax liability.
Hence, taken to the limit, preexisting state taxes
become the mechanism for achieving progressivity
in state spending under the BCPP strategy. Further,
the preexisting income tax and other general taxes
(or other sources of revenue, like federal grants)
fund any government programs not entirely fund-
able through benefit charges.
What About California’s Proposition 26?
In November 2010, California’s Proposition 26
modified its TIL regime partially in response to the
success of a version of the tax expenditure strategy.9
The new rule is as follows:
Any change in state statute which results in
any taxpayer paying a higher tax must be
imposed by an act passed by not less than
two-thirds of all members elected to each of the
two houses of the Legislature.10
This new rule prevents the simple tax expendi-
ture strategy for evading TILs. The kind of shifts in
tax burden required to achieve a revenue-neutral
package will increase the taxes on at least ‘‘any’’
taxpayer (one will do!), meaning that any such
proposal requires a supermajority.
As for this new rule, we should immediately note
that, as we suggested in our previous column,11 its
apparent success comes at a great cost. Proposition
26-like TILs interfere with traditional ‘‘base broaden-
ing plus rate lowering’’ tax reform — the model for
traditional, and efficient, bipartisan tax reform.
That is because closing any tax loophole increases
the taxes on ‘‘any taxpayer’’ even if the overall
package reduces rates on most taxpayers. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 and all the various bipartisan
proposals now floating about Washington and the
states would require a supermajority under this new
rule.
But Proposition 26 does not prevent the BCPP
strategy. Proposition 26’s supermajority rule applies
to ‘‘taxes,’’ but taxes are defined to exclude benefit-
type charges. For instance, the following is not a tax
and is thus not subject to the supermajority rule:
A charge imposed for a specific government
service or product provided directly to the
payor that is not provided to those not charged,
and which does not exceed the reasonable costs
to the State of providing the service or product
to the payor.12
Thus, the California State Legislature (or local
governments)13 could increase benefit charges by
majority vote just as it could add tax expenditures
by majority vote, and so even Proposition 26-style
TILs can be evaded.
Perhaps the next step is for TILs to include all
possible government charges, as the TIL-provision
in Missouri seems to do:
Counties and other political subdivisions are
hereby prohibited from levying any tax, license
or fees, not authorized by law, charter or self-
enforcing provisions of the constitution when
this section is adopted or from increasing the
current levy of an existing tax, license or fees,
above that current levy authorized by law or
charter when this section is adopted without
the approval of the required majority of the
qualified voters of that county or other political
subdivision voting thereon.14
Despite the broad language restricting ‘‘any tax,
license or fee,’’ the Missouri Supreme Court has
interpreted this language not to require elections in
connection with ‘‘fee increases which are ‘general
and special revenues’ but not a ‘tax,’’’ holding ‘‘that
increases in the specific charges for services actually
provided by an ambulance district are not subject to
[the Missouri TIL].’’15
And even without a favorable judicial interpreta-
tion of this sort, a variation on the BCPP strategy
would still be viable. All that would be needed would
be to partially privatize state spending programs
(like higher education), while keeping them highly
regulated so that they continue to operate in a
fashion similar to how they were run as state
8Refundable tax credits can be implemented through other
state taxes in addition to the income tax, although doing so is
somewhat more complicated.
9See, e.g., Lenny Goldberg, ‘‘California Governor Approves
Gas Tax Swap,’’ State Tax Notes, Mar. 29, 2010, p. 903, Doc
2010-6510, or 2010 STT 58-2 (describing complicated
revenue-neutral package); Proposition 26, Findings, sec. 1(d)
(new stricter TIL seems to target this ‘‘swap’’); Calif. Const.
Art. 13a, section 3(c) (Proposition 26 is retroactive to Jan. 1,
2010, and thus appears to invalidate the swap); AB 105,
2011-12 (61.2011) (California Legislature modifies swap in
part because of Proposition 26).
10Current Calif. Const. Article 13A, section 3(a).
11Gamage and Shanske, supra note 1, at 817.
12Calif. Const. Article 13A, section 3(b)(2).
13Proposition 26 made parallel changes to the ability of
local governments to raise taxes. See Calif. Const. Article 13C,
section 1(e).
14Mo. Const. Art. X, section 22.
15Keller v. Marion County Ambulance District, 820 S.W.2d
301, 303-305 (Mo. banc 1991); see also Arbor Investment
Company, LLC v. City of Hermann, 341 S.W. 3d 673 (Mo. banc
2011) (reviewing history of tax-fee jurisprudence in Missouri,
affirming use of five factor test as useful, and then affirming
lower court finding that utility charges were fees and not
taxes).
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spending programs, and then providing tax credits
for payments made to those new quasi-private enti-
ties.16 In other words, no fee that could be argued to
be a tax would be required.
Moreover, there is a sound reason why propo-
nents of TILs, and courts in interpreting their inten-
tions, have not applied TILs to benefit charges. As a
practical matter, what would it be like for tuition at
state colleges, public parking rates, building permit
fees, and so on all to be subject to a supermajority
requirement?17 As a matter of theory, why should
the voters impose extraordinary constraints on leg-
islators in connection with charges that they, the
voters, will usually have to pay only by opting to
engage in a voluntary activity?
How Should These Strategies Be Evaluated?
Let us assume that these strategies have been
explicitly used.18 Should we consider these strate-
gies to be unscrupulous dodges? We think not. There
is ample evidence that voters desire both lower taxes
and increased spending on all of the major programs
on which governments spend significant resources.19
TILs are one outgrowth of that bias in voters’ fiscal
preferences. That bias is particularly problematic
because voters appear to have little understanding
of what state governments actually do. And thus
these evasions are perhaps just a way of responding
to voters’ inconsistent demands regarding taxes and
spending.
But there is a deeper point to be considered about
the shift to benefit-type taxes. The primary mecha-
nism through which state governments have histori-
cally functioned in the face of voters’ fiscal biases
and irrationality is through representative govern-
ment. Elected representatives made the hard
choices that voters were unwilling to make. But
TILs undermine the elected representative model;
they stem from voters’ loss of trust in that model.
The benefit taxes model can function as a partial
replacement for the elected representative model. In
effect, the benefit taxes model relies on the market
to determine fiscal priorities, because taxpayers
must pay for more of the costs of governance through
direct benefit charges. Instead of wholly relying on
elected representatives to determine fiscal priori-
ties, the benefit taxes model relies much more on the
choices made by individual state citizens acting as
consumers. By using the BCPP strategy — combin-
ing benefit charges with progressive refundable tax
credits — a state can use the market-based benefit
taxes model for making allocative fiscal decisions
while continuing to use the elected representative
model for making distributive fiscal decisions.20
Markets are generally superior to elected represen-
tatives at making allocative decisions, but markets
on their own are not capable of enacting most forms
of distributive policies that voters might desire.
A state can use the market-based
benefit taxes model for making
allocative fiscal decisions while
continuing to use the elected
representative model for making
distributive fiscal decisions.
It is generally (and correctly) maintained that, by
mimicking the market to the extent possible, provid-
ing a service with a benefit charge should usually be
more efficient than paying for a service with a
general tax. By directly connecting payments to the
services received, benefit charges mitigate the in-
centives to change behavior that results in tradi-
tional forms of taxation creating excess burden (also
16The eligibility for tax credits for payments to those
quasi-private entities could be made conditional on the quasi-
private entities complying with state regulations. In that
fashion, the state can ensure that tax credits are issued only
to the extent that those entities fulfill a public purpose in a
similar fashion to how the entities would have been run had
they remained state spending programs rather than quasi-
private entities.
17That is not to say that provisions like Proposition 26 and
its predecessor, Proposition 218, do not complicate using
benefit-type financing. As we observed in our last column, the
ambiguities in both measures have resulted in an enormous
amount of litigation and uncertainty. Gamage and Shanske,
supra note 1, at 816; see also, supra note 15 for some of the
resulting litigation in Missouri. On California’s Proposition
218, which targeted special assessments, a particularly ven-
erable and potentially useful type of benefit charge, see, for
example, Darien Shanske, ‘‘Clearing Away Roadblocks to
Funding California’s Infrastructure,’’ State Tax Notes, Nov.
23, 2009, p. 567, Doc 2009-22866, or 2009 STT 223-7.
18In this column we can only offer educated intuitions
about the extent to which these evasion strategies are actu-
ally in use, but we do think that these strategies are being
used, at least to some extent (even if implicitly). In the last
decades, and particularly since the imposition of limitations
on the local property tax, there has been an explosion in the
use of benefit-type charges. There has also been an increase
in the use of state-level tax expenditures, though those two
phenomena have generally not been explicitly linked. And, in
at least some instances, state legislatures have explicitly
made use of our first evasion strategy, passing revenue-
neutral packages in order to evade TILs.
19See, e.g., David Gamage and Darien Shanske, ‘‘Three
Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Sa-
lience,’’ 65 Tax L. Rev. 19, 96 (2011); David Gamage, ‘‘Manag-
ing California’s Fiscal Roller Coaster,’’ State Tax Notes, Sept.
8, 2008, p. 659, Doc 2008-17246, or 2008 STT 275-12.
20For the original distinction between allocative and dis-
tributive fiscal policy, see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of
Public Finance (1959).
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known as deadweight loss).21 The use of the BCPP
strategy can thus limit the size of government in at
least two ways. First, to the extent that benefit
charges better reflect the level of government serv-
ices that people want, benefit charges are more
politically efficacious in shaping the government in
accordance with the voter’s wishes. Second, to the
extent that benefit charges raise funds while creat-
ing less excess burden or deadweight loss, benefit
charges reduce the distortionary effect that govern-
ment activity imposes on the larger economy.
Toward a Better Approach for
Fiscal Accountability
Our second — and deeper — strategy for evading
TILs, BCPP, is in part justified because this kind of
tax system better controls the size of government. Of
course, controlling the size of government is exactly
what TILs are supposed to do. At this point a
supporter of TILs might breathe easier. Surely two
ways to limit the size of government are better than
one?22 That is not true if the two ways undermine
each other. We have already seen how BCPP under-
mines TILs. How do TILs undermine BCPP?
Surely two ways to limit the size of
government are better than one?
That is not true if the two ways
undermine each other.
The main answer is that TILs undermine juris-
dictional competition. The BCPP solution to the size
of government conundrum in part results from bet-
ter matching of individual citizens to individual
services, but, to reach its full potential, this solution
must also match individuals to entire jurisdictions
(in a Tiebout fashion) — The heart of the Tiebout
Model is that individuals will ‘‘vote with their feet’’
by moving to jurisdictions with their preferred level
of taxes and services). There are only so many
government services, such as higher education, that
can be provided individually. Critical government
services, particularly at the local level, tend to come
in bundles — for example, K-12 education, police
protection, and parks.23 There is a local government
levy that, to some extent,24 acts as a blended price
for those local amenities, and that is the property
tax. Yet TILs at the local level obstruct the proper
functioning of jurisdictional competition because
with them localities cannot modulate their rates in
competition with one another.25
TILs at the state level have a similar effect on
interstate jurisdictional competition. Suppose, for
instance, that California did want to become more
like Texas. California could lower or abolish its
non-Texas taxes (for example, the corporate income
tax) by majority vote, but adding a new Texas tax
(that is, the margin tax)26 or increasing an existing
superior tax (that is, the property tax) or improving
another existing tax (for example, taxing sales of
services) would require a supermajority (or, in the
case of the property tax, a constitutional amend-
ment). Another debilitating effect of local TILs is
that they put pressure on state budgets to fund
services that could have been more efficiently
funded locally. Not only is that a less efficient use of
revenue, but also states typically rely on more
volatile revenue sources, and thus TILs at the local
level increase volatility at the state level — yet
state-level level TILs then make it more difficult for
states to adjust their tax rates to cope with that
combination of greater responsibility and volatil-
ity.27
Conclusion
As we have argued over these two columns, TILs
should not be assumed to shrink state governments.
Instead, TILs primarily serve to undermine the
effectiveness of government programs without nec-
essarily reducing the size of government. That is
reason enough to eschew TILs. But there is another
reason to avoid TILs and that is that they actively
impede a superior means of controlling the size of
government, namely the increased use of benefit
21For discussion of these concepts, see David Gamage and
Darien Shanske, ‘‘Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market
Salience and Political Salience,’’ 65 Tax Law Review 19, 61-65
(2011).
22See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan,
The Power to Tax 197-198 (1980) (arguing how limits on the
property tax can be a complement to jurisdictional competi-
tion as a means of controlling the size of government).
23Darien Shanske, ‘‘Above All Else Stop Digging: Local
Government Law as a (partial) Cause (and Solution) to the
Current Financial Crisis,’’ 43 Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form 663, 703-704 (2010) (discussing local amenity ‘‘bundling
rules’’).
24See, e.g., Darien Shanske, ‘‘How Less Can Be More:
Using The Federal Income Tax To Stabilize State And Local
Finance,’’ 31 Virginia Tax Review 413, 455-458 (2011) (review-
ing the evidence and concluding that there is an argument
that property taxes function as benefit taxes at least par-
tially).
25William Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 98-128
(2001).
26California’s proposed Business Net Receipts Tax re-
sembled Texas’s Margin Tax. California Commission On The
21st Century Economy, Final Report (2009), available at
http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/reports/documents/Comm
ission_on_the_21st_Century_Economy-Final_Report.pdf.
27For further discussion, see David Gamage, ‘‘Preventing
State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Prob-
lem,’’ 98 California Law Review 749 (2010).
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taxes and jurisdictional competition. Those alterna-
tive approaches to managing the growth of govern-
ment are far from panaceas, but, unlike TILs, they
are analytically coherent.28 ✰
28And, not surprisingly, there is some empirical evidence
that they are effective. See, e.g., Fischel supra; Wallace E.
Oates, ‘‘The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model,’’ in The Tiebout
Model at Fifty 21, 34-37 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006). Even
critics of the Tiebout model on normative grounds acknowl-
edge its relative explanatory power. See, e.g., Richard Brif-
fault, ‘‘Our Localism: Part I - Localism and Legal Theory,’’ 90
Columbia Law Review 346, 405-406, 416-417 (1990).
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